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Abstract
The doctrinal methodology is in a period of change and
transition. Realising that the scope of the doctrinal method
is too constricting, academic lawyers are becoming eclectic
in their use of research method. In this transitional time,
legal scholars are increasingly infusing evidence (and meth-
ods) from other disciplines into their reasoning to bolster
their reform recommendations.
This article considers three examples of the interplay of the
discipline of law with other disciplines in the pursuit of law
reform. Firstly the article reviews studies on the extent of
methodologies and reformist frameworks in PhD research in
Australia. Secondly it analyses a ‘snapshot’ of recently pub-
lished Australian journal articles on criminal law reform.
Thirdly, it focuses on the law reform commissions, those
independent government committees that play such an
important role in law reform in common law jurisdictions.
This examination demonstrates that while the doctrinal core
of legal scholarship remains intact, legal scholars are
endeavouring to accommodate statistics, comparative per-
spectives, social science evidence and methods, and theoret-
ical analysis, within the legal research framework, in order to
provide additional ballast to the recommendations for
reform.
Keywords: doctrinal research, interdisciplinary methods, law
reform
1 The Context
Like the Roman god Janus who is portrayed with two
faces one looking to the past and the other to the future,
the doctrinal methodology has strong roots in the past,
but it is now transitioning towards an electronic global-
ised future. This discussion concentrates on the future
of legal scholarship and the evolving taxonomy for
incorporation of insights from other disciplines, particu-
larly the social sciences, into reform-oriented legal
research.
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Even when a non-legal response might be just as appro-
priate to resolve a broader social problem, doctrinal
researchers have tended to continue to work within the
parameters of the discipline in order to make recom-
mendations for reform. They have confined their
research to a critical analysis and synthesis of the law.
However, realising that the scope of the doctrinal meth-
od is too constricting, academic lawyers are becoming
eclectic in their use of research method. Legal scholars
may not often utilise non-doctrinal methods themselves,
but they do include the results of the use of these meth-
ods in their research. In this transitional time, legal aca-
demics are increasingly infusing evidence (and methods)
from other disciplines into their reasoning to bolster
their reform recommendations. Current studies suggest
that this is not occurring to the same extent within the
law reform commissions.1
This article considers three examples of research and
writings by lawyers which are directed to law reform.
This analysis examines the extent of the interplay
between doctrinal analysis and research from non-doc-
trinal research methodologies within these sets of mate-
rials. Firstly the article reviews studies on the extent of
methodologies and reformist frameworks in PhD
research in Australia. Secondly it analyses a ‘snapshot’
of recently published Australian journal articles on
criminal law reform. Thirdly it focuses on the law
reform commissions, those independent government
committees that play such an important role in law
reform in common law jurisdictions.
This examination demonstrates that while the doctrinal
core of legal scholarship survives intact, legal scholars
are, to some extent, endeavouring to accommodate sta-
tistics, comparative perspectives, social science evidence
and methods, and theoretical analysis, within the legal
research framework, in order to provide additional bal-
last to the recommendations for reform.
1. K. Tranter, ‘Citation Patterns within the Australian Law Reform Com-
mission Final Reports 1992-2012’, 38(1) University of New South
Wales Law Review 318 (2015).
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2 Clarifying the Basics: What Is
Doctrinal Research?
Historically, doctrinal analysis has been the dominant
legal method in the common law world, although other
categories of research such as reform oriented, theoreti-
cal, and fundamental have been acknowledged as impor-
tant and to this extent doctrinal research has always
included an interdisciplinary aspect. Nevertheless, legal
academic success has been measured within a doctrinal
methodology framework, which includes the tracing of
legal precedent and legislative interpretation. The
essential features of doctrinal scholarship involve ‘a crit-
ical conceptual analysis of all relevant legislation and
case law to reveal a statement of the law relevant to the
matter under investigation’.2 There is general consensus
on this type of broad description. This ‘conceptual anal-
ysis critique’ is based on an understanding of the rules
of precedent between the court jurisdictions, the rules
of statutory interpretation, the tacit discipline knowl-
edge such as the difference between civil and criminal
jurisdictions, and various tests of liability, along with
the acknowledged reasoning methods, borrowed from
philosophy and logic, such as induction and deduction.
How does the doctrinal method relate to law’s discipline
paradigm? Thomas Kuhn viewed paradigms as a shared
frame of reference among researchers, which could be
upset by new revelations leading to generational strug-
gles between newer and more established researchers.3
Thus, paradigms are shared worldviews within a disci-
pline, which determine what topics are ‘suitable’ to
study, what methodologies are acceptable, and what cri-
teria may be used to judge success. Other descriptions
of paradigms include ‘taken-for-granted mind sets’, and
according to this view, socialisation into the discipline is
instrumental in ensuring that newcomers take on these
‘ways of knowing’.4 A discipline paradigm encompasses
any underlying philosophies, which again, in the com-
mon law world, has been predominantly liberalism, with
its ideas of rationalism, the importance of personal
property and individual self-determination. There are
other aspects to the paradigm – the once-prevalent view
of law as being objective and neutral, and positivism,
with its view of law as being ‘what is’ rather than what
‘could be’ or ‘should be’ also form part of the paradigm.
These characteristics are particularly ubiquitous in the
British common law legal tradition. The established
paradigm within research in the discipline of law has
involved the individual scholar’s legal voice.
So doctrinal research was the predominant category
identified in all the discipline assessments for law that
2. T. Hutchinson, ‘Valé Bunny Watson? Law Librarians, Law Libraries and
Legal Research in the Post-Internet Era’, 106(4) Law Library Journal
579, at 584 (2014).
3. T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1996).
4. J. Jones, ‘Undergraduate Students and Research’, in O. Zuber-Skerritt
(ed.), Starting Research — Supervision and Training (1992), at 54.
took place in the 1980s.5 In 1987, the Australian Pearce
Committee highlighted doctrinal as the main category in
its research taxonomy, describing it as research which
‘provides a systematic exposition of the rules governing
a particular legal category, analyses the relationship
between rules, explains areas of difficulty and, perhaps,
predicts future developments’.6 The Council of Austral-
ian Law Deans subsequently expanded on this earlier
definition – ‘Doctrinal research, at its best, involves rig-
orous analysis and creative synthesis, the making of con-
nections between seemingly disparate doctrinal strands,
and the challenge of extracting general principles from
an inchoate mass of primary materials’.7 In 2006, Mar-
tha Minow, Dean of Harvard Law School, identifies
‘doctrinal restatement’ as one of the main contributions
legal scholars make within their research.8 Susan Bartie
identifies ‘doctrinalism’ as a ‘unifying element in legal
scholarship in England and Australia’.9 Writing from a
European perspective in 2011, Rob van Gestel and
H.-W. Micklitz, describe the process in similar terms
stating that in doctrinal work, ‘arguments are derived
from authoritative sources, such as existing rules, prin-
ciples, precedents, and scholarly publications’.10
Accordingly, they continue, the law ‘somehow repre-
sents a system’ so that ‘through the production of gener-
al and defeasible theories, legal doctrine aims to present
the law as a coherent net of principles, rules, meta-rules
and exceptions, at different levels of abstraction’, and
‘decisions in individual cases are supposed to exceed
arbitrariness because they have to fit into the system’ so
that the system remains coherent.11 Therefore, there is
widespread agreement on the basic tenets of doctrinal
research.
The doctrinal method has been widely criticised, largely
because it has never been explicated sufficiently for
non-lawyers – or for lawyers themselves!12 Legal
researchers have not been in the practice of describing
their methodologies even within their academic work. In
the past, few PhD theses have provided a separate
description detailing the extent of the method. The
method is assumed knowledge within the discipline –
part of the grab-bag of skills associated with ‘thinking
like a lawyer’. The doctrinal method is qualitative and
idiosyncratic and, especially in the courts and in prac-
5. H. Arthurs, Law and Learning: Report to the Social Sciences and the
Humanities Research Council of Canada by the Consultative Group on
Research and Education in Law (1983), at 66; D. Pearce, E. Campbell &
D. Harding, Australian Law Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission (1987).
6. Pearce, Campbell & Harding, above n. 5, 2, 312 [9.17].
7. Council of Australian Law Deans, Statement on the Nature of Legal
Research (2005), at 3.
8. M. Minow, ‘Archetypal Legal Scholarship – A Field Guide’, 63(1) Jour-
nal of Legal Education 65-69, at 65 (2013).
9. S. Bartie, ‘The Lingering Core of Legal Scholarship’, 30(3) Legal Studies
345, at 350 (2010).
10. R. Van Gestel and H-.W. Micklitz, ‘Revitalizing Doctrinal Legal Research
in Europe: What About Methodology?’, European University Institute
Working Papers Law (2011)/05, at 26.
11. Ibid.
12. W. Twining, Taylor Lectures 1975 Academic Law and Legal Develop-
ment (1976) (Lagos: University of Lagos Faculty of Law).
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tice, the outcomes are often limited to the specific facts
of the case. As a way of combating criticism from the
physical sciences, Christopher Langdell, in the early
part of the nineteenth century, had tried to promote law
as a ‘legal science’, and the law library as a ‘lawyer’s lab-
oratory’. In the Preface to Contracts, he commented:13
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain prin-
ciples or doctrines. … Each of these doctrines has
arrived at its present state by slow degrees; in other
words, it is a growth, extending in many cases
through centuries. This growth is to be traced in the
main through a series of cases. … Moreover, the
number of fundamental legal doctrines is much less
than is commonly supposed. … If these doctrines could
be so classified and arranged that each should be found in
its proper place, and nowhere else, they would cease to
be formidable from their number. … It seemed to
me, therefore, to be possible … to select, classify, and
arrange all the cases which had contributed in any
important degree to the growth, development, or estab-
lishment of any of its essential doctrines.14
A few years later, in the Harvard Law School Annual
Report, Langdell again noted:
‘The work done in the Library is what the scientific
men call original investigation. The Library is to us
what a laboratory is to the chemist or the physicist, and
what a museum is to the naturalist’.15 In this respect
Langdell was suggesting that the law ‘ought to be stud-
ied from its own concrete phenomena, from law cases,
in the same way that the laws of the physical sciences are
derived from physical phenomena and experiments’.16
Historically, the doctrinal process has been described
within a problem framework with a number of linear
steps including assembling the facts, identifying the
legal issues, analysing the issues with a view to searching
for the law, undertaking background reading and then
locating primary material, synthesising all the issues in
context, and coming to a tentative conclusion.17 There is
certainly a need for a more sophisticated approach to
tease out the doctrinal method. Whether the doctrinal
method can ever be stated in a formulaic way is prob-
lematic. At its heart it is fluid. It is difficult to reduce to
an algorithm.
2.1 Additional Categories of Legal Research
Doctrinal research was not the only type of research cat-
egorised within the early discipline reviews. The reports
categorised other methodologies such as law reform
research, legal theory research, and fundamental re-
13. B. Kimball, The Inception of Modern Professional Education: C.C. Lang-
dell, 1826-1906 (2009), at 349, app., 2.
14. C.C. Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts (1871)
from Kimball, above n. 13 (emphasis added).
15. C.C. Langdell, Annual Report 1873-74 from Kimball, above n. 13, at
67, 349, app., 2.
16. Kimball, above n. 13, at 351, app., 2, n. 10; J. Redlich, The Common
Law and the Case Method in American University Law Schools (1914),
at 15.
17. T. Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law (2010) 41, at 42.
search separately.18 The Pearce Committee acknowl-
edged ‘reform-oriented’ research, research which ‘inten-
sively evaluates the adequacy of existing rules and which
recommends changes to any rules found wanting’, as a
separate category.19 Arguably what was being delineated
here was also a form of doctrinal research. Pure doctri-
nal research identifies and analyses the current law.
Reform-oriented research recommends change. Most
‘good’ quality doctrinal research goes well beyond
description, analysis, and critique, and invariably sug-
gests ways the law could be amended or the philosophy,
processes or administration of the law could be
improved. In many common law jurisdictions, there are
separate organisations working to develop a reform
agenda, these being the law reform commissions. These
are discussed at more length later in this article. The
reform-oriented research taking place in the commis-
sions was primarily doctrinal, but depending on resour-
ces, had a consultative aspect and the potential to be
‘interdisciplinary’ in its methods.20
The third type of research identified in the Pearce Com-
mittee Report was theoretical research – ‘research which
fosters a more complete understanding of the conceptu-
al bases of legal principles and of the combined effects of
a range of rules and procedures that touch on a particu-
lar area of activity’.21 Legal theory is a crucial tool to
provide a critical perspective on the law. However, in
the past, the utility of theoretical research may have
been diminished because of the limited exposure of the
profession to theory (and the language of theory) and
also because of the seeming gap between legal theory
and practice.22 Lawyers, even academic lawyers, have
been so steeped in positivism that they have not suffi-
ciently fostered knowledge of legal theory and the skills
of critique and applied this to the law.
Certainly this is not the case currently. Research activity
at postgraduate level always includes a conceptual
framework, a component of which is the theory under-
lying the law itself, and the philosophy that best encap-
sulates the researcher’s view of the law. In the post-
modern world, legal researchers understand that noth-
ing is objective. Even the choice of topic for examination
depends on the researcher’s world view. Very few doc-
trinal researchers would not acknowledge that fact in the
twenty-first century.
The Canadian Arthurs Report identified a further cate-
gory – ‘Research designed to secure a deeper under-
standing of law as a social phenomenon, including
research on the historical, philosophical, linguistic, eco-
nomic, social or political implications of law’, or funda-
mental research.23 This type of research treats law as a
phenomenon, as a problem with cause and effect.24 Fun-
18. Pearce, Campbell & Harding, above n. 5, 2, at 310 [9.12].
19. Ibid., 3, app. 3, at 17 [54].
20. D. Weisbrot, ‘The Future for Institutional Law Reform’, in B. Opeskin
and D. Weisbrot (eds.), The Promise of Law Reform (2005), at 31.
21. Pearce, Campbell & Harding, above n. 5, 3, app. 3, at 17 [54].
22. Arthurs, above n. 5, at 68.
23. Ibid., at 66.
24. Ibid., at 69.
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damental research uses social science methodologies to
examine the law through the prism of another disci-
pline’s. view – the economist or linguist or criminolo-
gist. Can fundamental research include a doctrinal com-
ponent? On the basis that all research on law necessarily
acknowledges the law as its basis then the answer to that
must be a resounding ‘yes’. Interdisciplinary legal arti-
cles, even those being written by non-lawyers from an
‘outsider’ view, frequently acknowledge the ‘black let-
ter’ or ‘doctrinal core’ of law as the starting point, what-
ever methodology is being used to pursue the author’s
agenda.25 Once again there must be an acknowledge-
ment that the boundaries between the various categories
are not closed in the present century. The methodology
denotes the difference.
There are at least two other important categories of legal
research which were not categorised separately in the
reports in the 1980s. These are policy research and com-
parative research. Public policy research normally takes
place within government departments rather than in
academia but it too has a doctrinal component. There is
certainly a cross-over with the methods used by the
institutional law reform commissions because the pro-
cess includes public consultation, discussion papers,
public submissions, surveys, public meetings, and writ-
ten reports. The difference lies in the degree of political
interference in public policy outcomes. The policy
inquiries are funded and driven by politicians, whereas
law reform terms of reference emanate from govern-
ment, and the research is conducted independently of
departmental interference.
Martha Minow identifies ‘Comparative and Historical
Inquiries’ as another typology or ‘intellectual contribu-
tion’ of legal scholarship which ‘Describe an earlier era
or contrasting legal regime; Contextualize the selected
era or regime utilizing social sciences such as anthropol-
ogy or history; and Illuminate differences, choices, or
continuities when compared with contemporary domes-
tic practice’.26 Despite not being placed in a separate
category, comparative research was acknowledged in the
earlier taxonomies which included statements about the
need for lawyers to ‘keep up’ with the ‘legal and other
relevant literature of all common law jurisdictions
including England, New Zealand, Canada and the Uni-
ted States’.27
From this discussion it is evident that there is a need for
a new interdisciplinary taxonomy that recognises the
interplay of the changing methods and purposes within
the legal discipline paradigm. Kuhn suggests that para-
digms can and do change and there is no doubt that this
is occurring within the discipline of law. The examples
examined in Section 3 of this article demonstrate that
the paradigm of the sole researchers working at their
computer and involved in qualitative doctrinal scholar-
ship remains. Even so, although the scholars do not
always apply the non-doctrinal methods themselves,
25. Bartie, above n. 9.
26. Minow, above n. 8, at 68.
27. Pearce, Campbell & Harding, above n. 5, 3, app. 3 at 17 [53].
there is an increasing application of the research results
from the use of such methods by legal scholars. The
door is definitely ajar to further change though the link
between doctrinal and non-doctrinal needs to be better
articulated and explored.
3 Examining Methodologies
Informing Recommendations
If we accept the methodological ground rules for doctri-
nal work, with the simplistic problem based structure as
a naïve framework, and also recognise that theory, fun-
damental research, comparative research, and law
reform have always played a role within the discipline’s
research landscape but often as separate genres, the next
issue is to examine how non-doctrinal methodologies are
being infused into legal research in the twenty-first cen-
tury. Is this fundamentally changing the doctrinal meth-
od? Are lawyers using non-doctrinal methodologies and
data as a matter of course? At what point in the analysis
is this data being infused into the discussion and how is
this evidence being synthesised with the law in coming
to a conclusion or recommendation for reform? What is
current practice and how valid are the outcomes or any
recommendations for change based on the studies? Is
there adequate internal cohesion in the analysis reinforc-
ing the recommendations? These are difficult questions
and this article can only hope to provide basic assess-
ments of trends using examples of previous studies on
PhD theses, a snapshot of recent articles written by law-
yers for Australian law journals and the studies of out-
puts of the law reform commissions.
3.1 Interdisciplinarity Evidenced in PhD Theses
and Law Journal Articles
There are few empirical studies examining the method-
ologies employed in legal scholarship.28 Any recent
studies of the use of legal research methodologies focus
on the postgraduate research arena. A survey of post-
graduate research in Australian law schools undertaken
in 2002 demonstrated that only 20% of all doctoral
research projects could be described as purely ‘doctri-
nal’.29 A more recent examination of HDR theses sub-
mitted to the Australasian Digital Thesis Program web-
site in the 5-year period 2004–2009 reveals that most of
the legal theses include a doctrinal component, even
though only a few students overtly identified the study
28. While statistical studies on methodologies being used in legal research
are rare, the topic of how lawyers research is not a new area of legal
academic concern. See, for example, E. Jones, ‘Some Current Trends in
Legal Research’, 15(2) Journal of Legal Education 121 (1962-1963).
29. D. Manderson and R. Mohr, ‘From Oxymoron to Intersection: An Epi-
demiology of Legal Research’, 6 Law Text Culture 159, at 164 (2003);
and see D. Manderson, ‘Law: The Search for Community’, in S. Margin-
son (ed.), Investing in Social Capital (2002), at 152 on breakdown of
empirical and doctrinal PhDs in Australia.
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they were conducting as being to any extent ‘doctri-
nal’.30 According to this study, 16 of the 60 theses exam-
ined include a chapter to describe the use of non-doctri-
nal methodologies, 21 theses discuss methodologies as
part of another chapter, and one deals with the method-
ology in an appendix. Any overt description of method
in the thesis invariably signalled an interdisciplinary
perspective, so the results demonstrate a higher propor-
tion of doctrinal papers than occurred in the 2002 sur-
vey with 37% (n = 22) in this group being purely doc-
trinal. This demonstrates that law is still essentially a
scholarly endeavour.
There are differences between the research process and
methods undertaken in a PhD program compared to a
great deal of legal academic scholarship. PhD require-
ments influence the scope and the depth of analysis of
any study as well as the choice of research methodology.
The PhD students will usually attempt a triangulation
of methods and may well base their conclusions on sev-
eral different collections of research data. The categories
of methods the PhD students choose are constrained by
the supervisors’ levels of expertise and the student’s
training. The non-doctrinal methodologies are invaria-
bly fully reported in the thesis, but the extent of doctri-
nal analysis is rarely acknowledged, described, or
unpacked.
Following completion, the PhD candidates may either
translate their work into a monograph or publish several
separate journal articles dealing with sections of the the-
sis. This entails segmenting the work. Broadly speaking,
different topics will be packaged for the various audien-
ces to best disseminate the research amongst the assor-
ted discipline audiences. The doctrinal legal analysis
will be published in a university law review or topic spe-
cific law journal targeting academic and practising sub-
ject specialists. As a rule, lawyers do not ‘like’ detailed
statistics because many have not been fully trained in
statistical method, so the law journal article will not
include extensive discussion of empirical work under-
taken in the thesis and certainly not mathematical for-
mulas. The theoretical framework of the project will be
emphasised for a law and society or sociology journal.
More practical policy and reform aspects combining the
law and social science studies will be directed to subject-
specific ‘current issues in the law’ titles. Studies includ-
ing details of the empirical analysis are diverted to the
criminology and social science journals.
Undoubtedly law academics use a similar approach for
publishing outputs from their larger funded and team-
based projects. Different aspects of the broader studies
are highlighted according to the publishing profile of
the target journals. For this reason it is difficult to valid-
ly determine the total extent of methodologies being
implemented by legal scholars simply by examining law
journal articles.
30. T. Hutchinson and N. Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do:
Doctrinal Legal Research’, 17(1) Deakin Law Review 83, at 99 (2012);
The study of the Australasian Digital Thesis Program website was
undertaken by Felicity Deane and Terry Hutchinson and completed in
October 2010.
Despite the existence of these limitations on assessing
legal research activity, an examination was conducted of
a set of journal articles on the topic of ‘reform of the
criminal law’ which were published in 2013. This ‘snap-
shot’ of publications encompassed articles published in
Australian law journals – but only those held on the
AustLII database.31 A basic search string resulted in a
retrieved list displaying 60 items. When book reviews,
speeches, and government publications were omitted,
then only thirty-two refereed journal articles remained
as a relevant subset of the database.32 This subset inclu-
ded articles which were written by lawyers, included
doctrinal analysis, and specifically dealt with ‘criminal
law and reform’. This entire group of articles had been
published in refereed (blind peer reviewed) journals.
The examination of the articles in the retrieved list
focused on the author’s profession (all had legal qualifi-
cations), whether the articles included a doctrinal analy-
sis of legislation or case law, the extent of the descrip-
tion of additional methods, and the point at which it was
introduced into the discussion. Were statistics included
in the analysis and if so, where were these sourced?
Where a comparison was included, the study considered
whether this was contextual or a full comparison and
whether there was also reference to public international
law. Did the author mention law reform commission
recommendations?
All the articles used a doctrinal research methodology to
some extent. In two articles there was more emphasis on
theory, criminology, and international law rather than
an analysis of specific case law or legislation. The doctri-
nal methodology design was tacit; not so any non-doc-
trinal methods. Surveys, for example, were outlined and
explained using appropriate tables. While only two of
the articles were reporting that the authors had them-
selves undertaken surveys, interviews, or statistical proj-
ects,33 eighteen used statistics published elsewhere in
discussing the basis of concerns. This provided founda-
tion for the discussion of the prevalence of offences and
involved the use of news article reports, law reform sub-
missions, and social science studies (predominantly
reports of surveys) from medical and other interdiscipli-
nary journals. To this extent the statistics provided con-
text for the legal discussion.
All the articles analysed pertinent secondary literature
with only two including an explicit acknowledgement of
the literature review. The review of the literature is an
31. Australasian Legal Information Institute <www. austlii. edu. au/>.
32. These were located on the AustLII database using the search term
‘crim* w/10 (reform* OR recommend*)’ within the Australian journal
titles published in 2013. The search was conducted on 16 February
2015. There are approximately 100 Australian journal titles on this data-
base including most of the university law reviews.
33. M. Brown, G. Lansdell, B. Saunders & A. Eriksson, ‘‘I’m Sorry But You’re
Just Not That Special …’ Reflecting on the ‘Special Circumstances’ Pro-
visions of the Infringement Act 2006 (Vic)’, 24(3) Current Issues in
Criminal Justice 375 (2013) (semi-structured interviewing and court
observations and quantitative, descriptive data extracted from CLC
databases); H. Douglas and R. Fitzgerald, ‘Legal Processes and Gen-
dered Violence: Cross-Applications for Domestic Violence Protection
Orders’, 36(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 56 (2013)
(examination of Magistrates Court files).
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implicit quality indicator in the doctrinal methodology
paradigm. The extensive footnoting used as the prefer-
red citation style for this group of articles provides an
updated record of the secondary literature on the topic.
The scope and currency of these references provide a
strong warrant for the author’s credentials and knowl-
edge of the subject area. Relevant texts, journal articles,
and law reform publications are referenced where appli-
cable to the discussion rather than brought together
under a formal literature review heading.
Fourteen of the thirty-two articles were jointly auth-
ored, signalling a definite movement away from the lone
scholar paradigm. Six of the articles disclosed their
funding sources as being either from external publicly
funded grants or university internal grants, and five of
these were jointly authored. At least 6 of the 14 jointly
authored articles emanate from subject-specific univer-
sity or faculty research centres and working groups.
Those articles that were jointly authored were likely to
include interdisciplinary approaches, such as criminolo-
gy and law, or emanate from the research centres.
The actual number of discrete comparative analyses in
this retrieved group was low. Only two of the articles
had as their main objective a comparison of the law
between jurisdictions. However, twenty-three of the
articles include a comparative review of the existing law
particularly for the Australian state jurisdictions as well
as pertinent examples from international jurisdictions.
The Arthurs Report had recognised that comparative
and historical research involving legal rules was likely to
lead to ‘new’ solutions.34 However, their comment in
1983 was that ‘experience, and our own investigation,
shows that historical or comparative research is not
undertaken routinely even by scholarly investigators,
and rarely carried out by practitioners. Perhaps we stand
on the threshold of change in this regard …’.35 The
change has occurred. It is widely recognised that com-
parative research approaches are becoming the norm
within the current doctrinal method, and this small
snapshot of articles reinforces this perspective. There
are discrete comparisons of legal provisions in two or
three jurisdictions, comparisons of the legislation
between numbers of jurisdictions in order to provide
context, and at the very least the use of comparative data
and information on the law in other jurisdictions using
secondary literature. Law is less parochial in the twenty-
first century. Globalisation and technology mean that
the wider legal sphere is more accessible and pertinent
for the legal scholar. This in itself is intriguing and
needs more examination to test and confirm this prac-
tice using a larger body of evidence. Certainly reports
published by law reform commissions have consistently
included a comparative approach. The current expecta-
tion in the literature is that there will be some statement
of the legal jurisdictional status quo or an acknowledge-
ment of obvious discrepancies in practice elsewhere.
34. Arthurs, above n. 5, at 68.
35. Ibid.
This forms part of the context of the doctrinal discus-
sion.
Many of the articles (twenty-three) include recommen-
dations for reforming the law informed by the evidence
presented. Suggestions for reform included calls for
social reform to engender change, improved data collec-
tion and review mechanisms, or specific non-legislative
action. Five of the articles simply critiqued the existing
laws.
Some of the limitations of this pilot study must be
acknowledged openly. It might be expected that more
non-doctrinal methods would be found in studies of
criminal law and law reform. Studies of reform in other
areas of law such as tort law or corporate law or equity
might well be more legalistic in approach. There is
space for more extensive studies of the published litera-
ture to gauge such differences. Overall, within this pilot
study of thirty-two doctrinal articles on reform of the
criminal law written by lawyers, there was evidence of
an increasing reference to comparative law and to pub-
lished statistics and social science evidence to contextu-
alise the law and to reinforce the doctrinal analysis and
conclusions. Studies utilising empirical methods or with
a mainly theoretical focus were less common.
3.2 Interdisciplinarity and the Work of the Law
Reform Commissions
The third study centres on the reports emanating from
the law reform commissions. Before examining the
research within the commissions, it is necessary to
understand a little more about how the commissions
function. Law reform bodies have an established role in
common law history. The commissions are independent
government agencies charged with the task of reforming
the law. Evidence exists of law reform commissions in
Scotland in 1425 and various ad hoc committees set up
to reform and rationalise the law over the centuries in
England,36 with law reform committees being formed in
Australia from the 1870s.37 The permanent English Law
Commission was established in 1965, and statutory law
reform commissions on a similar model are now estab-
lished in most common law jurisdictions.38 The Austral-
ian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) was established
as an independent statutory body in 1975. Under s21 of
the Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996 (Cth)
the Commission’s brief is to systematically develop and
reform the law by:
36. W. Hurlburt, Law Reform Commissions in the United Kingdom, Aus-
tralia and Canada (1986), at Chapter 2 Law Reform Commissions in the
United Kingdom 15-99 generally.
37. Ibid., at 100-68: Chapter 3 Law Reform Commissions in Australia; See
also Australian Law Reform Commission, Annual Report 1975 (1975),
at 5-19.
38. There are Law Reform Commissions in most of the Australian jurisdic-
tions. Canada too has multiple reform commissions or institutes, for
example, The Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia and the non-
statutory Alberta Law Reform Institute. In the United Kingdom, the Law
Commission and the Scottish Law Commission are statutory commis-
sions established by the Law Commissions Act 1965 (UK); The United
States has multiple committees or commissions, for example, The Cali-
fornia Law Revision Commission and the Michigan Law Revision Com-
mittee.
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i. bringing the law into line with current conditions
and ensuring that it meets current needs; and
ii. removing defects in the law; and
iii. simplifying the law; and
iv. adopting new or more effective methods for admin-
istering the law and dispensing justice; and
v. providing improved access to justice.39
The Australian state law reform commissions are, with a
few exceptions, modelled on the national body, though
they invariably have fewer resources.40 The terms of
reference for law reform enquiries are normally set by
the Attorney General in consultation with the Commis-
sion. Consultation with the general public and stake-
holders is always a key element of the inquiry process.
Figure 1 demonstrates the typical law reform process.
There have been trends in the popularity of law reform
commissions resulting in the periodic closure and
rebirth of agencies in common law jurisdictions depend-
ing on government finances and reform agendas.41 The
ALRC for example has been reviewed several times
since 1975.42 Possibly because of this high level of scru-
tiny, the Commission’s Annual Reports contain very
detailed information on performance and outcomes.43
The levels of implementation of all ALRC reports are
reasonably high:
– 60% are substantially implemented;
– 28% are partially implemented;
– 2% are under consideration;
– 3% are awaiting response; and
– 7% have not been implemented.44
39. Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996 (Cth), and see the Public
Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth).
40. Commonwealth of Australia, The Senate, Legal and Constitutional
Affairs References Committee: Inquiry into the Australian Law Reform
Commission (2011), at 9.
41. N. Rees, ‘The Birth and Rebirth of Law Reform Agencies’, Australasian
Law Reform Agencies Conference 2008 Vanuatu 10-12 September
(2008).
42. 1977-1979 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional
Affairs inquiry; 1993-1994 House of Representatives Standing Commit-
tee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs; 1997-1998 Possible Improper
Interference with a Potential Witness before the Parliamentary Joint
Committee on Native Title and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Land Fund (73rd Report); 2010-2011 Senate Legal and Constitutional
Affairs Committee Inquiry into the Australian Law Reform Commission.
43. Australian Law Reform Commission, Report 125: Annual Report
2013-13 (2014), at 26.
44. Ibid., at 27.
The law reform commissions are touted as one of the
main conduits for law reform.45 However, there are
many other channels available for advocating legal and
regulatory change. These include ‘parliamentary com-
mittees and ad hoc commissions of inquiry’,46 as well as
periodic reports from internal government policy units,
reports from government instrumentalities such as the
sentencing councils, the children’s commissions, the
human rights commissions, and even the courts’ annual
reports. Tranter has identified two possible approaches
to law reform – one being the ‘research institute’
approach where ‘recommendations are generated by
experts analysing relevant data and academic literature’
and the other evidencing a ‘community engagement’
approach where ‘recommendations are located as having
emerged from a process of community consultation’.47
By and large the law reform commissions fall within the
latter ‘community engagement’ category. Many of these
other bodies would be categorised as ‘research insti-
tutes’.
Although comparative legal perspectives and references
to published statistics feature in the reports and publica-
tions of the formally constituted law reform commis-
sions, the principal method employed by the commis-
sions is public consultation. Justice Kirby, the founding
chair, commented that the ALRC ushered in a new era
for law reform in Australia with the ‘value adding’
involved in public consultation.48 The current ALRC
Chair, Rosalind Croucher, also champions the consulta-
tion process:
Through its widespread and thorough consultation
strategies, the ALRC is able to build consensus and
understanding of its proposals within the community
and this assists the government in turn to implement
various recommendations, even in a context where
change may be challenging.49
45. Commonwealth of Australia, above n. 40, at 9 [2.18].
46. L. Barnett, ‘The Process of Law Reform: Conditions for Success’, 39
Federal Law Review 161 (2011).
47. Tranter, above n. 1; Barnett, above n. 46.
48. Justice Kirby has concluded that ‘the most original “value added” of the
ALRC – and its chief contribution to the law reform technique in the
years after its establishment – was its emphasis on public consultation’.
M. Kirby, ‘Are We There Yet?’, in B. Opeskin and D. Weisbrot (eds.),
The Promise of Law Reform (2005), at 435.
49. Australian Law Reform Commission, above n. 43, at 5.
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Public consultation constitutes a non-doctrinal method
and as such is interdisciplinary in its approach. Howev-
er, consultation was probably not what the former Com-
missioner of the Law Commission of Canada, Roderick
Macdonald, had in mind when in the mid-90s he was
arguing for a ‘reimagining’ of law reform processes,
including ‘co-opting non-academic and academic’, ‘non-
legal and legal’, with the notion of reform being to ‘tran-
scend doctrine’.50 Macdonald advocated that law reform
should be focusing on alternative reform processes (and
outcomes) rather than simply presenting a report
together with redrafted legislation as a standard
response, and that there should be a different choice of
projects moving away from substantive law topics to
broader areas of social justice and ‘the relation of law
and society’.51 W.H. Hurlburt challenged all of these
ideas in a spirited reply in the same issue of the jour-
nal.52 However, these methodological constraints were
perceived as a failing in the Canadian Arthurs Report
which held that ‘the basic problem with much law
reform research is rather that it is located toward the
doctrinal end of the methodological spectrum, and con-
sequently fails to confront most problematic issues’.53
Greycar and Morgan perceived that the law reform bod-
ies were using ‘limited consultation processes that often
leave out of account the concerns of those most affected’
and disadvantaged groups.54 Greycar and Morgan pro-
vide examples of the lack of empirical methods and data
in the formation of law reform recommendations in
favour of so-called “common sense” anecdotal informa-
tion’.55 More recently Angela Melville’s comparison
between New Zealand and Canadian law reform com-
missions pointed out the difference in approaches.56
Melville noted the methodological insularity, ‘top down’
approach and even paternalistic attitude exhibited by
some commissions who confined the stakeholder list and
limited the questions addressed to them.57 Other com-
missions were more interested in broader questions –
presenting papers in open academic conferences prior to
the reports being published so as to engage with stake-
holders, and commissioning private empirical studies
prior to writing the reports.
However, this article is examining the extent of interdis-
ciplinarity and the use of non-doctrinal methodologies
by lawyers to reform the law. The question, therefore,
must be whether the evidence, gathered from the con-
sultations and submissions sent to the law commissions
in their enquiries, is being infused into the recommen-
50. R. Macdonald, ‘Recommissioning Law Reform’, 35 Alberta Law Review
831, at 870 (1996-1997).
51. Ibid., at 875.
52. W.H. Hurlburt, ‘The Origins and Nature of Law Reform Commissions in
the Canadian Provinces: A Reply to “Recommissioning Law Reform” by
Professor R.A. Macdonald’, 35 Alberta Law Review 880 (1996-1997).
53. Arthurs, above n. 5, at 70.
54. R. Greycar and J. Morgan, ‘Law Reform: What’s in It for Women?’, 23
Windsor Yearbook on Access to Justice 393 (2005).
55. Ibid.
56. A. Melville, ‘Conducting Law Reform Research: A Comparative Perspec-
tive’, 28(2) Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 153 (2007), at 153.
57. Ibid., at 158, 159.
dations? Are the commissions using the submissions in
drafting their recommendations? Kieran Tranter’s study
into the citation practices within the ALRC final reports
from 1992 to 2012 found that ‘submissions were the
most frequently cited source’ (46%), supporting an
argument that ‘the best way to influence the executive is
to locate recommendations within what can loosely be
called the ‘community’.58 Community participation not
only provides ‘responses and feedback’, it also promotes
‘a sense of public ‘ownership’ over the process of law
reform’.59 However, whether there is a statistical corre-
lation between the number of those respondents sup-
porting a course of action and the final recommendation
is more difficult to determine. The submissions are
often divided as to their arguments and proposals for
the most advantageous way forward. Not all responses
are helpful in terms of the information or views they
proffer, but the ability to refer back to those providing
submissions can assist deliberations. The likelihood is
that the recommendations are being based primarily on
case law and the arguments provided by the judges and
the weight of commission opinion favouring a particular
line of action, rather than emanating from the views of
those providing submissions. This issue requires further
research.
To what extent do the law reform commissions have
recourse to academic material on the issues they are
studying? Many of the recommendations extend more
broadly than simply reforming the legislation – but this
very much depends on the scope of the terms of refer-
ence handed to the agency. While the reports are refer-
encing legal reforms implemented (and sometimes eval-
uated favourably) in other jurisdictions, recent examina-
tion of the reports produced by the commission has
demonstrated a paucity of reference to published aca-
demic commentary on the issues they are examining,
and also little empirical data to back up the recommen-
dations.60 So in Tranter’s study, ‘citations to secondary
academic material in the form of books, journal articles
and conference papers were quite low at only 6% of the
total citations’.61
There may be clear explanations for this. The reports
have narrow terms of reference, and it may be the case
that only a very few academic articles are ever directly
on point. In addition, the articles and texts referenced in
the final reports are in no way fully indicative of the
background literature reviews, extensive annotated bib-
liographies, and working papers produced by the Com-
missions, and which are never made public; all that is
published is the final reports. In the past, publishing
costs may have limited the materials that could be
released. However, this is certainly not the case at pres-
ent when electronic files can be easily uploaded onto the
websites. It could well be argued that when extensive
background research has been undertaken at the public
58. Tranter, above n. 1.
59. R. Atkinson, ‘Law Reform and Community Participation’, in B. Opeskin
and D. Weisbrot (eds.), The Promise of Law Reform (2005), at 160.
60. Tranter, above n. 1, at 349.
61. Ibid.
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expense, then these preliminary working papers should
be made available. Until this occurs, it should be quer-
ied whether the low level of citation of secondary mate-
rial truly reflects the background research undertaken
for the reports.
A more worrying aspect of the research is the apparent
lack of reference in the reports to empirical studies. The
literature reviews cover secondary legal literature. There
is no evidence of the law reform commissions undertak-
ing literature reviews of the wider social science and sci-
entific evidence base on the issues being covered apart
from clarification and definition of existing processes
when required. The emphasis always lies on the primary
materials – the legislation and case law. The secondary
literature is only used to assist in interpreting the law.
There is little or no attempt to deal with the wider con-
text apart from what is provided by the submissions and
consultations. As Barnett has commented, there is a real
need in law reform to ‘uncover the facts upon which law
reform proposals are based’, so that ‘they need to see the
entire picture and identify the real problem(s) before
launching into a search for policy solutions’.62 So refer-
ence is being made to the community stakeholders, and
their views on the issues. The law is being considered
closely. But very rarely is new data compiled from with-
in the commissions. There are reasons for this. The use
of additional interdisciplinary methods is dependent on
government budgets. Even attempting to educate the
public about an issue can be an expensive process. The
commissions focus on the role of clarifying the law for
other lawyers and the general public. As detailed previ-
ously, the law reform commissions have always per-
formed this role well.
Further research is necessary to determine if there are
regularly gaps between existing empirical data, the con-
sultation responses, and the recommendations. Howev-
er, the recommendations in a law reform report are not
the final word. Any major recommendations for legisla-
tive change must be presented to cabinet and then par-
liament for debate. If there are gaps in the arguments
presented, then those aspects should be addressed at
that point.
4 Conclusion
It is clear from this discussion that academic lawyers are
using non-doctrinal methods, but they are often infus-
ing these methods within their doctrinal research frame-
work. Definite inroads have been made in relation to the
use of comparative approaches. Arguably comparative
law, extending far beyond a simple backward glance to
the genesis of a legal proposition, is now an intrinsic
part of legal scholarship. Published government statis-
tics and the published results of social science research
are also being included in doctrinal academic writing to
provide contextual framing or to highlight the disparity
62. Barnett, above n. 46, at 181.
between the law, social policy, and the existing social
evidence base. There are some examples of joint author-
ship and lawyers working in tandem with those from
other disciplines to investigate all sides of the contextual
prism in an effort to best achieve enlightened critique.
Theoretical and philosophical discussions invariably
include footnotes to the doctrinal stasis to provide factu-
al legitimacy. Theory is also increasingly used as a vehi-
cle for critiquing and analysing the basis of the ‘black
letter’ law. Theory is part of the contextual framing.
Researchers query – ‘What was the pre-eminent theory
at the point in history when this law commenced? Are
those theories and those economic and political views
infused in the law still relevant and valid today?’ The
doctrinal method remains true to its core, but it is cer-
tainly less constrained than in the past.
This article has used examples of existing studies on
PhD students’ theses, a snapshot of recent articles writ-
ten by lawyers for Australian law journals and the out-
puts of the Australian Law Reform Commission to pro-
vide some basic assessments of trends in the use of
interdisciplinary and doctrinal methods especially
focusing on reform agendas. These are Australian exam-
ples. Is there any great disparity between Australian
legal scholarship and that being undertaken elsewhere?
Further empirical study is required on this issue. More
research needs to be carried out to determine at what
point in the legal analysis the non-doctrinal data is being
infused into the discussion and how exactly doctrinal
lawyers are infusing this evidence in coming to a conclu-
sion or making recommendations for reform. The dis-
cussion has by no means finished. There is evidence of a
broadening of the method overall, but we need a more
sophisticated study of larger amounts of data to verify
the trends observed so far.
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